Security model
The public website plans migrations and distributes the toolkit. It does not receive customer backups. Migration data travels only to the vault selected by the technician and customer.
The supported transfer paths are a trusted LAN or explicitly approved VPN. The installer creates no firewall, router, or public-tunnel rules. The operator must confirm that SMB remains private; the documentation never instructs users to expose it to the internet.
Jobs use validated, unique directories beneath an operator-restricted vault root. Version 1.0 does not create a separate Windows principal for every job. Windows servers should use BitLocker or equivalent volume encryption; SMB encryption is requested when the share is created.
Every completed file receives a SHA-256 digest. Restore verifies the vault manifest before copying and verifies the destination afterward. Changed or unreadable files remain visible exceptions.
Backup is additive. Source deletions are not mirrored, the old PC is never erased, and cleanup is a separate, approval-gated procedure after customer acceptance.
Version 1.0 does not collect passwords, browser sessions, Wi-Fi keys, MFA secrets, or product keys. Required sign-ins remain human tasks on the cutover report.
Open or rapidly changing files can require a final closed-app delta. Cloud placeholders must be hydrated. Application binaries and hardware-bound licenses require supported reinstall and activation paths.